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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Federal Government-Do as we say, not as
we do
Much has been written about the relationship
between federal and state governments with re-
spect to the state's authority to tax transactions
and their ability to require tax collection.' Per-
haps some of the confusion lies in the logical ar-
gument that if a jurisdiction has power to tax,
then it also has power to require individuals or en-
tities to collect such tax. For example, the federal
government taxes individuals on the income
earned from capital gains, dividends and inter-
est.2 Yet the federal government requires financial
institutions holding such investment to report in-
come information to the individual and to the In-
ternal Revenue Service ("IRS"). 3 Thus, the federal
government has added a significant compliance
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formerly was on the Senate Finance Committee Tax Staff for
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). She also has served
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bipartisan congressional National Commission on Restruc-
turing the Internal Revenue Service. The opinions in this ar-
ticle are those of the author and not necessarily of her em-
ployers.
The author holds a Bachelors of Science in Accounting
from the University of Evansville, a Masters in Taxation from
the George Washington University and is a 2002Juris Doctor
candidate at the Washington College of Law, American Uni-
versity.
1 Transaction taxes are more commonly referred to as
sales and use taxes. One of the obstacles to resolving the is-
sue of collection of such tax lies in the bifurcation of the one
tax, a tax on transactions, into what appears to be two distinct
and different taxes: a sales tax and a use tax. In reality these
"two taxes" are one and the same-a tax on a transaction
(i.e., on the sale of an item). Unfortunately, this bifurcation
contributes to the confusion and to the political rhetoric
characterizing expansion of collection requirements as im-
posing a "new" tax.
2 See I.R.C. § 61 (Supp. IV 1999).
3 See id. at § 6045 (Supp. IV 1999).
burden and cost to the financial institution with
no offsetting benefit. This is done all in the name
of increasing "voluntary" compliance but is in re-
ality a coercive measure to ensure reporting of
such income by the individual because the indi-
vidual is now "on notice" that the IRS has the in-
come information.
Yet, in the area of state and local transaction
taxes,4 the Supreme Court, through case law, and
Congress, through inaction, have imposed limita-
tions on the states' ability to enforce compliance
with their laws. This limitation jeopardizes state
revenues and confuses the tax policy debate re-
garding Internet taxation-specifically, transac-
tion taxes on Internet purchases. 5
B. The Internet-What is it?
In 1969, an experimental project bore what
4 Hereinafter "transaction taxes" refers to both state and
local sales and use taxes.
5 See Matthias Manz, letter to the editor, Direct to You, Tax-
Free, WASHINuTON POST, Mar. 27, 2000, at A26. The author
noted:
I have made several purchases through Priceline.com,
which I then picked up at my local Giant. I received a
substantial discount on those items, which also were free
of sales tax. When I pick up the items, a Giant employee
rings up [the] sale-including tax-at the register, but
I've already paid Priceline.com, where the price does
not include any tax. Priceline.com seems to offer retail-
ers a means of selling goods tax-free. The businesses sim-
ply set up a [website], direct their customers to make
purchases there and then have them come into the store
to pick up the items. Retail stores could set up computer
terminals on their premises or even substitute a [web-
site] for a cash register. The Post article said Giant in-
tends to have its own [website] operating within the
year. If electronic commerce is not subjected to sales tax,
then that tax's days as a significant source of government
revenues are numbered. Maybe this is the covert goal of
conservative politicians such as Virginia's Gov. James Gil-
more.
Id.
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would later become known as the Internet. The
Internet, which initially only connected govern-
ment with academia, 6 was significantly expanded
in 1986 with the development of a high-speed net-
work.7 This new network expanded and acceler-
ated access.8 It was not until 1993, with the devel-
opment of the user-friendly interface commonly
referred to as the Web, did the Internet's com-
mercial applications begin to be realized.-
The Internet is the interconnection of hun-
dreds of thousands of computers functioning as
postal substations routing data packets by the best
route available.' 0 Several packets may make up a
single message and may travel along different
routes, recombining back into the single message
at the destination."I The "roads" for the data in-
clude telephone networks, cable TV systems, satel-
lite links and fiber optic cables.12 Because of these
characteristics, the Internet has been called a
"global network of networks."' 3
The Internet is not, however, a telecommunica-
tions service. 14 The Telecommunications Act of
199615 (the "1996 Act") defined "telecommunica-
tions service" as the "offering of telecommunica-
tions for a fee directly to the public, or to such
classes of users as to be effectively available di-
rectly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used."' 16 In contrast, the 1996 Act defined "infor-
6 DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET NAMES
AND ADDRESSES 2-3, at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
domainname/6_5_98dns.htm (June 5, 1998) [hereinafter
COMMERCE PAPER]; OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEP'T OF TREA-
SURY, SELECTED TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE 6, at http://www.ustreas.gov/taxpolicy/
internet.html (Nov. 1996) [hereinafter TREASURY PAPER]; IN-
TERACTIVE SERVICES ASS'N TASK FORCE WHITE PAPER, LOGGING
ON TO CYBERSPACE TAX POLICY, 12 STATE TAX NOTES 209, 211
(Jan. 20, 1997) [hereinafter ISA WHITE PAPER] ("The In-
ternet began in 1969 as an experimental project of the Ad-
vanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), and was called
'ARPANET.' ").
7 See COMMERCE PAPER, supra note 6, at 2; ISA WHITE PA-
PER, supra note 6, at 211 ("In 1986 the National Science
Foundation (NSF) developed its high-speed network to allow
researchers access to NSF's new supercomputer sites and pro-
vide a faster medium for data transmission between the
sites.").
8 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 211.
9 See id. at 211.
10 See HENK BRANDS & EVAN LEO, THE LAW AND REGULA-
TION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS 37 (1999).
11 See id.; see also The Accidental Superhighway: A Survey of
the Internet, THE ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter
THE ECONOMIST].
12 See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 11, at 3.
13 RICHARD RAYSMAN ET. AL., MULTIMEDIA LAW: FORMS
AND ANALYSIS § 101 (2) (2000).
mation service" as "the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making availa-
ble information via telecommunications.' 7 For
Internet providers, parity with the telecommuni-
cations industry would bring with it the same reg-
ulatory standards and tax requirements.' This
would move Internet providers from an environ-
ment of little regulation and tax requirements to
one of significant regulation and tax require-
ments.
C. The Future of the Internet
Although many consider the Internet industry
young, 19 current statistics show the significant im-
pact of the Internet.
1. Access to the Internet
The Department of Commerce reported that
access to the Internet would reach 304 million
people worldwide in 2000.20 Not all of the In-
ternet's use, however, involves the consumer
purchase of a tangible good. In fact, Internet use
more likely involves e-mail; checking information
such as sports, news, weather and schedules; and
making reservations. 21 Nonetheless, the Internet
14 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 153(46) (Supp. IV 1999); see
also ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 215 ("The fact that
Congress did not intend Internet and online services to be
classified as telecommunications services is evidenced by the
plain wording of the 1996 Act, which makes it clear that the
services offered by Internet and online service providers are
not telecommunications services.").
15 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151 et. seq. (2000)).
16 47 U.S.C. § 153(46).
17 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
18 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 215 ("[A] ny deci-
sion that Internet and online services are telecommunica-
tions services would undermine the long-standing distinction
made by the FCC between 'basic services' (which were to be
subject to regulation), and 'enhanced services' (which were
not to be subject to regulation.").
19 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 213 ("Internet
and online services are experiencing rapid growth, but it is
important to recognize that the Industry is still relatively
young.").
20 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000, at
http://www.ecommerce.gov (June 2000) [hereinafter DEP'T
OF COMMERCE].
21 See Press Release, Bureau of the Census, Computer
Use Up Sharply; One in Five Americans Uses Internet, Cen-
sus Bureau Says, at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/
www/1999/cb99-194.html (Oct. 14, 1999).
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is providing a new medium for retailers to market
their wares by supplementing paper catalogs for
mail-order companies, 22 and extending the reach
of once only brick-and-mortar retailers. 23 The In-
ternet's expansion is limitless. It offers twenty-four
hour, seven-day-a-week access to every home and
business for virtually any kind of service or prod-
uct.
2 4
2. Types of Transactions
Internet transactions are as diverse as brick-and-
mortar retail transactions. Purchases of goods
over the Internet include clothing, furniture, toys,
books, videos, computer products, music, flowers
and food.25 The Internet also provides a new me-
dium for services (online services and consumer
services such as financial, legal and tax return
preparation services), and the business commu-
nity is responding by forming strategic alliances to
take advantage of such limitless opportunities.2 6
Technology-interested firms note, or perhaps
warn, that "the growth of Internet and online ser-
vices will be increasingly important to every state's
economic development . . . [T]echnological op-
portunities will naturally migrate to states that are
tax-friendly. ,2
7
22 See generally TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 8
Web pages are now supplementing paper catalogs for
many mail order companies and wholesalers. These Web
pages are similar to pages from a paper catalog, display-
ing images of the goods and product information. Links
to the vendor's inventory control system can make it pos-
sible to verify whether the requested goods are in stock.
For example, one such [website] is a bookseller that al-
lows customers to search a database of over one million
books, searching by either subject or name. It is open
twenty-four hours a day and has customers in over [sixty]
countries. This [website] does not merely allow custom-
ers to select and order books[,] but also recommends
related titles and will automatically notify customers
when a desired book is published.
Id.
23 See generally ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE ("ACEC"), REPORT 1O CONGRESS 11 n.11, athttp:/
/www.ecommercecommission.org/report.htm (Apr. 2000)
[hereinafter ACEC REPORT TO CONGRESS] ("The term 'click
and mortar' stems from the term 'brick and mortar' and re-
fers to those businesses that conduct business through both a
physical storefront and a [website]. ['Brick-and-mortar']
businesses, also known as 'Main Street retailers,' are busi-
nesses that only conduct business through physical
storefronts.").
24 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 211 ("As increas-
ing numbers of private network companies establish links,
3. Number of Transactions
The number of transactions conducted over the
Internet continues to leap at amazing rates of
growth. Transactions of tangible personal prop-
erty totaled $500 million in 1995.28 In a mere 3
years, sales increased to $5.9 billion.29 In 1997, a
study estimated that sales would reach $6.6 billion
by 2000.30 Of note, however, is that by 1999, sales
doubled from their 1998 levels to $11.04 billion. 3 1
In the second quarter of 2000 alone, the estimate
of U.S. retail e-commerce sales was $5.5 billion. 32
As a percentage of total retail sales, the $5.9 bil-
lion in 1998 accounted for 0.2% of total retail
sales. 33 By 2004, these Internet transactions are
expected to account for 2.5% of total retail
sales.14
4. Significant Industry
Some have argued that use of the Internet is in-
significant.3 5 Are these commentators trying to
convince policy-makers that the Internet is simply
not worth their time and energy? Perhaps a gen-
eral laissez-faire approach to the Internet is de-
sired, and perhaps that approach can and should
be argued on its merits, rather than trying to de-
called 'gateways,' to the Internet for their private subscriber
online services, there is no limit to the extent to which the
Internet can expand.").
25 See generally DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 20.
26 See id.
27 ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 210.
28 See id. at 213.
29 Internet Retail Sales in 1999 Expected to Double, WALL ST.
j., May 18, 1999, at A4 [hereinafter Internet Sales Double].
30 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 213.
,I Internet Sales Double, supra note 29.
32 See Press Release, Bureau of the Census, Retail E-Com-
merce Sales in Second Quarter 2000 Increased 5.3 Percent
From First Quarter 2000, at http://www.census.gov/mrts/
www/current.html (Aug. 31, 2000).
33 See Internet Sales Double, supra note 29 (citing a report
by the Direct Marketing Ass'n).
'4 See id.
'15 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 213.
A recent survey of households in the United States and
Canada revealed that only 17% of individuals over the
age of 16 had used the Internet during the previous six
months, 13 percent had used the World Wide Web, and
only 14% of those users, or 1.8% of the total popula-
tion[,] had purchased anything over the Web.
Id. (citing CommerceNet/Nielsen Media Research Recontact
Study (Aug. 13, 1996)).
20011
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
tract from the real issue with claims of such a
"young" (i.e., insignificant) industry.
How much is enough? How big is big enough?
When is the Internet "grown up?" Internet trans-
actions are sufficiently significant and widespread
for those opposing government policies regarding
the Internet to finally admit that this new technol-
ogy has "grown up." As such, it is time forjurisdic-
tional integration3 6 through uniform, equitable
and neutral tax policies for all transactions, re-
gardless of the medium.
II. TRANSACTION TAXES AND "ADVANCES
IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY' 37
As stated supra, the limitation on the states' abil-
ity to "enforce" compliance with their tax laws-
specifically transaction taxes on Internet
purchases-jeopardizes state revenues and con-
fuses the tax policy debate regarding taxation of
the Internet.3 8
36 See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NA-
TIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDI-
TIES 121 (1982) [hereinafter OLSON].
37 See generally Quill v. North Dakota., 504 U.S. 298, 303
(1992). The Court stated the facts of the case, noting that:
Quill has taken the position that North Dakota does not
have the power to compel it to collect a use tax from its
North Dakota customers. Consequently, the State,
through its Tax Commissioner, filed this action to re-
quire Quill to pay taxes (as well as interest and penal-
ties) on all such sales made afterJuly 1, 1987. The trial
court ruled in Quill's favor, finding the case indistin-
guishable from Bellas Hess, specifically, it found that be-
cause the State had not shown that it had spent tax reve-
nues for the benefit of the mail-order business, there was
no 'nexus to allow the state to define retailer in the man-
ner it chose.' The North Dakota Supreme Court re-
versed, concluding that 'wholesale changes' in both the
economy and the law made it inappropriate to follow
Bellas Hess today. The principal economic change noted
by the court was the remarkable growth of the mail-or-
der business 'from a relatively inconsequential market
niche' in 1967 to a 'goliath' with annual sales that
reached 'the staggering figure of $183.3 billion in 1989.'
Moreover, the court observed, advances in computer
technology greatly eased the burden of compliance with
a 'welter of complicated obligations' imposed by state
and local taxing authorities.
Id. (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208-09,
213, 215 (1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) and Nat'l Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue of I11., 386 U.S. 753, 759-60
(1967), overruled by Quill, 504 U.S. 298) (citations omitted)).
38 See generally Matthias Manz, letter to the editor, Direct to
You, Tax-Free, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 27, 2000, at A26.
39 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE, 105rii CONG., DESCRIPTION OF S. 442, THE "IN-
TERNET TAX FREEDOM ACT," AND A PROPOSED CHAIRMAN'S
A. Purpose of Transaction Taxes
"Under the Constitution, a state or local gov-
ernment may impose taxes on sales that occur
within its jurisdiction or on the use of property
within its jurisdiction."39 Transaction taxes serve
as an important source of state and local govern-
ment revenue. 40 Transaction taxes based on the
sale of tangible property and certain services are
bifurcated into a "sales tax" and a "use tax."41 A
transaction tax is essentially a tax imposed on con-
sumers, based on their location and the location
of consumption. 42 The distinction is that sales tax
is imposed on sales by an in-state retailer because
it is assumed the purchaser will consume the item
in the state of purchase. A use tax, however, is im-
posed on sales by an out-of-state retailer because
the item is presumably consumed within the pur-
chaser's state of residence. The issue is, therefore,
who should collect use taxes, not who should pay.
AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 4, available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-58-98.htm (Comm. Print 1998).
40 See generally JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2-3 (6th ed. 1997).
Receipts for state and local governments have grown tenfold
in 80 years from $400 million in 1915 to $392 billion in 1995.
Further, with $132 billion (34% of revenue) of transaction
taxes collected in 1995, it serves as the primary source of state
revenue for 45 states and the District of Columbia. See also
Alison Bennett, Debate Foreshadows E-Commerce Battle As Gilmore
Defends Commission Report, BNA DAILY TAX REP., Apr. 7, 2000,
at G6-G7 (citing Rep. Gene Green's (D-TX) statement that
ACEC's "proposal would put states such as Texas, which rely
solely on sales tax, in a very difficult position").
41 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339 (6th ed. 1990) (de-
fining a "sales tax" as "a state or local-level tax on the retail
sale of specified property or services[,]" which is generally
paid by the purchaser and collected by the seller "as an agent
of the government"); id. at 1543 (defining a "use tax" as a
"sales tax that is collectible by the seller where the purchaser
is domiciled in a different state" and a tax imposed on the
"use, consumption, or storage of tangible property, usually at
the same rate as the sales tax, and levied for the purpose of
preventing tax avoidance by the purchase of articles in a state
or taxing jurisdiction[,] which does not levy sales taxes or has
a lower rate"); see also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S.
577, 581 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of the use
tax).
42 See Robert J. Cline & Thomas S. Neubig, Masters of
Complexity and Bearers of Great Burden: The Sales Tax System and
Compliance Costs For Multistate Retailers, Ernst & Young, LLP,
24, available at http://ecommercecommission.org (Sept. 8,
1999) [hereinafter Cline & Neubig]. This document was pre-
pared for the eCommerce Coalition, which is a "a broad-
based, national coalition dedicated to providing sound policy
information on electronic commerce taxation." Id. at 1.
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B. Constitutional Limitations
The two seminal cases involving the constitu-
tional limitations on a state's authority to impose
transaction tax collection requirements on out-of-
state retailers are National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. De-
partment of Revenue of the State of Illinois43 and Quill
v. North Dakota.4 4 National Bellas Hess limited the
states' authority to require transaction tax collec-
tion based on the Due Process Clause 45 and the
Commerce Clause.4 6 The case involved a mail-or-
der catalog company incorporated in Delaware,
which the court held was not required to collect
transaction taxes from Illinois consumers. 47 The
Supreme Court held that National Bellas Hess
lacked a physical presence (nexus) 48 in Illinois. 49
Thus, the state lacked the proper jurisdiction to
impose collection authority for transaction taxes.
1. Due Process Clause
Twenty-five years later the Supreme Court re-
placed its earlier due process limitation with a
Commerce Clause limitation. 50  The Supreme
Court held in Quill that the Due Process Clause
"requires some definite link, some minimum con-
nection, between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax."51 In rejecting its
previous due process holdings, the Court ex-
amined the evolution of its jurisprudence. 52 In
applying its holding in Burger King Corp. v.
43 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
44 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
45 National Belas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758; U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2.
46 National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760; U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3.
47 National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 753-54, 760.
48 See generally ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 216
(" 'Nexus' means 'contact.' For state tax purposes, 'taxable
nexus' means sufficient in-state contact to subject an out-of-
state seller to the taxing jurisdiction of a state. In state tax
terms, however, 'nexus' is often used to mean 'taxable
nexus.' " (citations omitted)).
49 See National Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
50 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 302.
51 Miller Brothers, Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954).
52 Quill, 504 U.S. at 307. The Court noted:
Building on the seminal case of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, we have framed the relevant inquiry as whether a
defendant had minimum contacts with the jurisdiction
,such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
,traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '
In that spirit, we have abandoned more formalistic tests
that focused on a defendant's 'presence' within a State
in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defen-
Rudzewicz, 53 the Quill Court held that:
Comparable reasoning justifies the imposition of the
collection duty on a mail-order house that is engaged in
continuous and widespread solicitation of business
within a State. Such a corporation clearly has 'fair warn-
ing that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereign.' In 'modern commercial life' it
matters little that such solicitation is accomplished by a
deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of drummers:
The requirements of due process are met irrespective
of a corporation's lack of physical presence in the tax-
ing State.5 4
2. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States. '55 One aspect
of the Commerce Clause also is referred to as the
"negative" or "dormant" Commerce Clause. The
Court held in South Carolina State Highway Depart-
ment v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc.56 that "by its own
force" the Commerce Clause prohibits certain
state actions that interfere with interstate com-
merce. 57 The Quill Court recognized the evolu-
tion of its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, 58 with
limitations.
The Quill majority's characterization of its own
decision in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady59
challenges logic. 60 Complete Auto established a
four-prong test used to sustain a tax under the
Commerce Clause.61 The Court in Quill, while re-
dant's contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in
the context of our federal system of Government, to re-
quire it to defend the suit in that State. In Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, the Court extended the flexible approach that Int'l
Shoe had prescribed for purposes of in personam juris-
diction to in rem jurisdiction, concluding that 'all asser-
tions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated ac-
cording to the standards set forth in Int'l Shoe and its
progeny.'
Id. (citations omitted).
53 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
54 Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
55 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
56 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
57 Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at 185.
58 See generally Quill, 504 U.S. at 309 ("Our early
cases . . . swept broadly, and in Leloup v. Port of Mobile we
declared that no State has the right to lay a tax on interstate
commerce in any form." (citations omitted)).
.5 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
60 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 322 (White, J., dissenting) ("In
my view, the Court should also overrule that part of Bellas
Hess which justifies its holding under the Commerce
Clause.").
61 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brody, 430 U.S. 274,
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jecting Complete Auto as a basis for overturning its
decision in National Bellas Hess, admitted that the
evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence
would not dictate such a result. 62 The Court justi-
fied its diversion from overturning National Bellas
Hess, stating that "the Commerce Clause and its
nexus requirement are informed not so much by
concerns about fairness for the individual defen-
dant as by structural concerns about the effects of
state regulation on the national economy." 63 It is
difficult to understand how the Court saw struc-
tural concerns as different from those mecha-
nisms ensuring fairness.
The Court also urged that its holding perpetu-
ated the bright-line rule for transaction taxes, stat-
ing that "[s]uch a rule firmly establishes the
boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose
a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces
litigation concerning those taxes." 64 Ironically,
the Supreme Court was merely passing the buck
to Congress. The Court rationalized its lack of ac-
tion because "Congress is now free to decide
whether, when, and to what extent the States may
burden interstate mail-order concerns with a duty
to collect use taxes."65 As such, the majority re-
fused to find "substantial nexus."
C. Failings of the Transaction Tax
This failure to provide a fair, equitable and neu-
tral approach to transaction tax collection has left
the states trying to find the proverbial "edge" of
the envelope,6 6 has left retailers burdened by the
279 (1977). The test is whether a "tax [1] is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is
fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the State." Id.
62 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 311 ("While contemporary Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate the same re-
sult were the issue to arise for the first time today, Bellas Hess
is not inconsistent with Complete Auto and our recent cases.").
63 Id. at 312.
64 Id. at 315.
65 Id. at 318.
66 For cases holding that there is no "taxable nexus" see
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Bloomingdale's By Mail Ltd. v. Common-
wealth Dep't of Revenue, 567 A.2d 773 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1989), aff'd, 591 A.2d 1047 (Pa. 1991); cf CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. v.
Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996);
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996).
67 See Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 14 (noting that
five states do not have a transaction tax: Alaska, Delaware,
uncertainty of state enforcement and has left con-
sumers with the impression that sales over the In-
ternet are not subject to transaction taxes.
1. Lack of Uniformity-Burden of Compliance
State sovereignty allows state and local govern-
ments to institute their own tax rate, tax base and
compliance requirements (e.g., audits, tax return
filing requirements, payment frequency, forms,
registration). The District of Columbia and 45
states impose a transaction tax.6 7 Localities within
33 states68 impose transaction taxes and also may
institute their own tax rate, tax base and compli-
ance requirements. Also, with respect to the local
jurisdictions, their boundaries do not necessarily
correspond to the postal ZIP codes. 69 The result is
that a business operating nationally is confronted
with 7,600 individual taxing jurisdictions, 7 with
over 1,300 in Texas alone. 7' The magnitude of
compliance could be even worse if every local gov-
ernment imposed a sales and use tax. 72
The burden of compliance, however, with trans-
action taxes is too often discussed only in terms of
the burden faced by the retailer. But there is a
burden on the individual-the voluntarily compli-
ant individual-of record keeping and tax base
calculations. 73 Ironically, the Supreme Court's
limitation on the duty of retailers to collect trans-
action taxes because of the interstate burden actu-
ally imposes a greater burden on the compliant
consumer.
74
Montana, New Hampshire and Oregon).
68 See ACEC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 17.
69 See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Radical Simplification of State
Sales and Use Taxes: The Prerequisite for an Expanded Duty to Col-
lect Use Tax on Remote Sales, 1, at http://www.ecommercemis-
sion.org/document/McLureProposalll3.doc (last visited
Sept. 20, 2000) [hereinafter McLure]. McLure was Deputy
Assistant Sec'y of Treasury under Ronald Reagan from
1983-85.
70 See NAT'L TAX ASS'N, COMMUNICATIONS AND ELEC. COM-
MERCE TAX PROJECT FINAL REPORT i, available at http://
www.ntanet.org (Sept. 7, 1999) [hereinafter NTA].
71 See Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 1.
72 See id.
73 See generally John Simons, States Chafe as Web Shoppers
Ignore Sales Taxes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999, at BI [hereinaf-
ter Simons] ("Believe it or not, the burden is on you to calcu-
late and pay the state and local taxes on what you buy. But if
you're like the overwhelming majority of Internet shoppers,
you're likely to leave that tax unpaid.").
74 See generally John Schwartz, Internet Tax Panel to Hold
Final Meeting: States Try to Untangle Issue of Web-Based Sales Tar-
iffs, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 20, 2000, at A4 [hereinafter
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2. Cost of Compliance 3. Lack of Enforcement
The resulting compliance and/or administra-
tion costs lie significantly with businesses, not gov-
ernments. 75 The compliance costs borne by small
and medium size retailers would prove to be an
unacceptable cost for a tax agency.76 For example,
if a retailer establishes taxable nexus in just 15
states, the retailer's compliance costs rise in in-
verse proportion to its size: from 7.2% to 90% for
small retailers, from 3.7% to 33% for medium re-
tailers and from 1% to 8.3% for large retailers. 77
If a retailer expands operations nationwide, com-
pliance costs jump higher. For a medium retailer,
costs jump to 48%.78 Further compliance with lo-
cal transaction taxes alone accounts for over 50%
of the compliance burden for small and medium
size retailers.79 As such, if a retailer sells goods
over the Internet, it is likely that such retailer op-
erates nationwide and is potentially subject to sig-
nificant compliance costs.
State sovereignty, however, in the era of the lo-
cal merchant to the local customer, "is no longer
possible, or at least not a realistic alternative, as it
implies enormous complexity for remote vendors
and thus the legal inability to tax remote sales, in-
cluding those in electronic commerce."8' 0 States
must challenge the benefits received (maintain-
ing revenue sources) for the cost (giving up some
state sovereignty).
Schwartz]. The author noted:
Businesses have commonly paid use taxes, but consum-
ers have not ... But it looks increasingly likely that the
free ride will end. In the political battle shaping up now
over the future of the Internet, most governors are be-
ginning to realize that they will have to collect use taxes
to protect their revenue base. Some states [including
Michigan, North Carolina and New Jersey,] already are
beginning to step up their collection efforts.
Id.
75 See generally ECOMMERCE COALITION, SIMPLIFICATION OF
THE STATE AND LOCAL SALES AND USE TAX SYSTEM 2, at http:/
/ecommercecommission.org (Nov. 15, 1999) [hereinafter
SIMPLIFICATION]; see also Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 16
(citing WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF REVENUE, RETQALERS'
COST OF COLLECrING SALES TAX STUDY, available at http://
dor.wa.gov/reports/retail/retailstudy.doc (Dec. 1998) [here-
inafter WASHINGTON STATE COMPLIANCE STUDY]). The com-
pliance study noted that for in-state retailers (i.e., operating
in one state), the compliance costs as a percentage of sales
tax collected for small retailers are 7.2%, 3.7% for medium
retailers, and 1% for large retailers. In contrast, the cost of
administering the sales tax system is no more than 1% of
taxes collected for a state's department of revenue. WASHING-
TON STATE COMPLIANCE STUDY, this note.
The consumer pays transaction taxes. It is the
collection of these taxes that is at issue. "The low
level of use tax compliance suggests that consum-
ers are not aware of their use tax liabilities, do not
voluntarily comply with the law, or that the en-
forcement efforts of taxing jurisdictions are low,
ineffective or nonexistent."'81 Collection is an is-
sue, in part, because of the near impossible task
facing states to collect transaction taxes on sales
made to in-state residents from out-of-state retail-
ers. The result is an extremely low compliance
rate for such tax; estimated annual lost revenue to
state and local governments is over $3.5 billion.82
D. Requirements for Expanded Nexus
As the number of Internet transactions in-
creases,8 3 the need for certainty in compliance is
essential to states in terms of revenue and to indi-
viduals in terms of meeting their legal obligation
to pay their tax liabilities. Expanded nexus pro-
vides this certainty and ensures that all taxpayers
comply with their transaction tax liability because
collection is imposed at the retail level for all
transactions.
Plans for changes to the transaction tax systems
of states and localities have more similarities than
differences. Unfortunately, in the typical negotiat-
76 Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 16 ("An administra-
tive cost ratio of 4 to 7% of tax collections would not be ac-
ceptable from a state budget perspective." (citing JOHN F.
DUE &JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL
STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION 325 (1983))).
77 See Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 20.
78 See id. at 21.
79 Id. at 23 (citing WASHINGTON STATE COMPLIANCE
STUDY, supra note 75).
80 McLure, supra note 69, at 7.
81 Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 5.
82 See Internet Tax and Trade Issues: Hearing on S. 442 and
H.R. 4105 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 51,
55 n.3 (1998) (statement of Harley T. Duncan, Executive Dir.
Fed'n of Tax Adm'rs) [hereinafter Duncan Statement]; see
also Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 4-5 ("[S] tate and local
governments are questioning the system's effectiveness in
collecting sales and use taxes on their citizens' purchases
from remote sellers . . . but noncompliance is a significant
problem for consumer purchases . . . Even if consumers
know that a use tax liability exists, payment of the tax may
not be straightforward or convenient.").
83 See Internet Retail Sales in 1999 Expected to Double, WALL
ST. J., May 18, 1999, at A4.
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ing strategy, the states do not want to give up on
uniformity if the retailers do not give up on ex-
panded collection requirements. 84 This state of
purgatory can only be resolved with federal inter-
vention requiring the following three changes to
transaction taxes.
1. Require Inquiry into State of Residence
The only way to achieve a neutral, fair and sim-
ple transaction tax system is to require the same
collection responsibility by each retailer.8 5 Essen-
tially, a state would impose collection require-
ments without regard to physical presence in a
state.
Accepting that the Internet lacks geographical
boundaries and that the world is becoming a
global marketplace, it is reasonable to examine
the relationship among countries as a basis for
taxation at the subfederal (state) level. "The
United States, as do most countries, asserts juris-
diction to tax based on principles of both source
and residence. If double taxation is to be avoided,
however, one principle must yield to the other."8 6
This is accomplished through tax treaties with
other countries. "[C] ountries tend to restrict their
source-based taxing rights with respect to foreign
taxpayers in order to exercise more fully their res-
idence-based taxing rights. '8 7 The growth in In-
ternet technologies, from a country-to-country
perspective, "will likely require that principles of
residence-based taxation assume even greater im-
portance. In the world of cyberspace, it is often
difficult, if not impossible, to apply traditional
source concepts to link an item of income with a
specific geographical location . . . [whereas] al-
most all taxpayers are residents somewhere." 88
On a state level, the Supreme Court's decision
in Goldberg v. Sweet 9 establishes a foundation for
84 See NTA, supra note 70, at 5, 10 ("[]t immediately be-
came clear that any effort to draft a statute was premature in
light of the numerous areas of disagreement and uncer-
tainty . . . Nothing is agreed to until everything is agreed
to.").
85 See McLure, supra note 69, at I ("Sound public policy
demands that remote vendors, including those engaged in
electronic commerce, collect use tax on their sales.").
86 TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 22.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 23.
89 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
90 See generally Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 254.
91 ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 219.
02 NTA, supra note 70, at i.
the application of expanded nexus and imposi-
tion of tax based on residency. In Goldberg, the
Court held that a consumer's service address
should be used for situsing telecommunications
transactions for purposes of imposing tax.90 In-
dustry representatives have urged such an ap-
proach. Using Goldberg for transaction taxes, "a
practical agreement between the [ilndustry and
the states to rely on the subscriber's billing ad-
dress as the equivalent of the service address in
determining the situs of a sale could solve most
problems" with the transaction taxes.91
2. Require One Rate Per State
With 7,600 jurisdictions imposing a transaction
tax,92 one solution to this complexity is to allow
each state to retain sovereignty while restricting
the localities from setting their own tax rates.93
The states could then establish an allocation
mechanism to distribute the taxes to the locali-
ties. 9 4 The states also should have uniform regis-
tration, form filing requirements, audit standards
and record-keeping requirements.
3. Require A Uniform Menu for the Tax Base
As with the tax rates, the complexity resulting
from the current ability of the states and localities
to set their own tax base is excessive. One reason
for this variation is the absence of a national sales
tax that could provide a standard tax base; in the
case of the income tax, most states piggyback on
the federal definition of taxable income. More im-
portantly, the variation comes from the funda-
mental fact that the tax is a transaction tax that
can be adjusted to include an almost infinite com-
bination of goods and services in the tax base.95
The solution to such complexity is to require
9 See generally id. at 23.
94 For example, in Virginia, a retailer collects a transac-
tion tax from the consumer at the rate of tax of 4.5%; 3.5%
remains with the state government and 1% is distributed to
the appropriate local government. See VIRGINIA DEP'T OF TAx-
ATION, VIRGINIA BUSINESSES SALES AND USE TAX, at http://
www.tax.state.va.us/btsutax.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2000).
95 See NTA, supra note 70, at 12 ("In Rhode Island and
Minnesota, shoes with cleats are taxed, but sports shoes with-
out cleats are exempt. Above the knee boots are taxed in
Minnesota, and Texas does not exempt clothing but exempts
protective boots with a life-span of less than six months.").
Another source of complexity is the increasing interest in
"holidays." New York, Florida and Texas have provided "holi-
days" during which certain items in the tax base are exempt
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the states to use a uniform tax base "menu" based
on classifications of products to include or ex-
clude from a state's tax base using the United Na-
tions Central Product Classification system as a
model.9 6 This maintains state sovereignty while
ensuring greater uniformity.
III. IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON THE
TRANSACTION TAX DEBATE
A. Growth in the Internet-Growth in the
Problem
The failings of the transaction tax enforcement
on consumer purchases from out-of-state retailers
result in more than just a loss of revenue-it re-
sults in a competitive advantage for out-of-state re-
tailers and discrimination against in-state retail-
ers.9 7 The problem is heightened with the growth
of online businesses and the migration to Internet
purchases, away from "Main Street" purchases.
Further, the Supreme Court's failure in Quill to
overturn National Bellas Hess with respect to both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce
Clause insulates retailers who lack taxable nexus,
such as Internet retailers ("e-tailers"). Internet re-
tailers present the same challenges in the transac-
tion tax debate as mail-order catalog retailers, but
with increased volume and reach.98
B. Lack of Geographical Boundaries-The
Unknown Consumer
A unique feature, however, of Internet sales is
the simultaneous blurring of "both the geo-
from tax. The "holidays" vary as to length and scope. Unfor-
tunately this problem will most likely only increase as more
states jump on this political bandwagon. See, e.g., Lori Mont-
gomery & Matthew Mosk, Glendening Salvages Pay Raise for
Teachers, WASHINGTON PosT, Apr. 11, 2000, at B4 ("[T]he
General Assembly has approved a weeklong holiday from the
state's sales tax in August 2001.").
96 See NTA, supra note 70, at iii-iv.
97 See McLure, supra note 69, at 1.
98 See generally RobertJ. Cline & Thomas S., Neubig, The
Sky is Not Falling: Why State and Local Revenues Were Not Signifi-
cantly Impacted by the Internet in 1998, 8 n.9, at http://www.
ecommercecommission.org/document/Ernst&Young.pdf
(June 18, 1999) [hereinafter Sky Falling] ("In a recent study
of online retail transactions, the author found that online
computer sales and mail-order sales are very similar in terms
of responses of purchasers to tax rate differences. This sug-
gests that there may be a high degree of substitution between
mail-order and online computer sales." (citing Austan Gool-
sbee, In a World Without Borders: The Impact of Taxes on Internet
graphic boundaries between states and the defini-
tional boundaries between goods and services."99
By design, the Internet (and thus the Internet re-
tailer) does not know the location of the con-
sumer l10 "The Internet has no physical loca-
tion... [1] n principle and generally in practice, it
makes no difference whether the information or
electronic money sought to be transmitted are
within one jurisdiction or between several, as the
Internet pays little or no regard to national
boundaries." '01
Yet therein lies the problem. Retailers, who are
required to collect transaction taxes based on the
source or destination addresses, are limited by the
"unknown" location of the Internet. State and lo-
cal governments predict further erosion of their
revenue base as the consumption of tangible
goods via the Internet increases. This erosion is
based on unknown locations and Supreme Court
limitations. 102
C. Forest for the Twigs
As previously discussed, the Internet presents
unique problems not faced by mail-order catalog
retailers. Such problems include the ability to use
"unaccounted" electronic money,1 0 3 to bundle
taxable and nontaxable goods and services, 0 4 and
to deliver digital products 0 5 The details of these
problems are beyond the scope of this article.
However, the more significant concern is that
these problems should not overshadow the issue.
Fair, neutral and simple tax policies should ad-
Commerce, at http://www.ecommercecommission.org/
document/goolsbeel 4.pdf (Nov. 1998))).
99 Sky Falling, supra note 98, at 1.
100 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 210; see also
TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 20 ("The pieces of an In-
ternet address ... tell you who is responsible for maintaining
that name. It may not tell you anything about the computer
corresponding to the actual Internet address, or even where
that machine is located ... Untraceable use of an Internet
site, with the permission of the site's controllers, is quite easy
to arrange.").
101 TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 19.
102 See generally ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 210,
220.
103 See TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 16 ("In an unac-
counted system, the e-money is issued and passes through the
economy without a transaction trail. . . [and moves] through
the economy anonymously.").
104 See Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 13.
105 See id.
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dress the collection and imposition of transaction
taxes.
Any taxation of Internet sales should ... neither distort
nor hinder commerce. No tax system should discrimi-
nate among types of commerce, nor should it create in-
centives that will change the nature or location of trans-
actions. The system should be simple and transparent.
It should be capable of capturing the overwhelming
majority of appropriate revenues, be easy to implement
and minimize burdensome record keeping and costs
for all parties. 6
Once that larger issue is resolved, these nu-
ances should then be pursued.
D. Is Technology the Answer to Taxation of
the Internet?
In Quill, the Supreme Court's holding was pre-
mised on an undue burden on interstate com-
merce resulting from collection responsibility im-
posed on the out-of-state retailer. Today,
technology not only provides the Internet, but it
also reduces the burden necessary to overcome
further Commerce Clause objections. 0 7
Some nationally operated retailers already vol-
untarily collect transaction taxes based on the des-
tination of the tangible personal goods.108 "For
multistate sellers that have nexus to collect taxes
in a number of states, it becomes economically
feasible to use commercially available software
106 EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A FRAMEWORK
FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 5, at http://www.trea-
sury. gov/taxpolicy/library/Internet.pdf (July 1, 1997).
107 See generally SIiPLIFICATION, supra note 75, at 4 n.5.
[N]on-uniformity is the technology obstacle, not the
number of taxing jurisdictions. If you solve the first,
technology exists or can be developed to handle the sec-
ond . . . Because it is not cost effective to completely
automate the ambiguity inherent in the current sales
and use tax system, technology is not a viable solution
for the vast majority of Internet vendors without dra-
matic simplification of the existing system.
Id.
108 See Simons, supra note 73 ("Microsoft Corp. is one of
the few companies that regularly factor in state and local
sales taxes. As consumers type their addresses on an elec-
tronic sales form, the Redmond, Wash., company's billing
system calculates the tax for that location.").
109 Cline & Neubig, supra note 42, at 20.
1 10 See McLure, supra note 69, at 4 ("Software would be
used (a) to determine the state and local tax rates that
should be applied to remote sales of particular products[,]
and (b) to prepare the reports containing the information
needed by states to channel revenues to the appropriate local
jurisdictions."); see also DATA KINETICS LTD., ADAPTIVE TECH-
NOLOGY: A FOUNDAION FOR AUTOMATING THE TAXATION OF
E-COMMERCE 1, at http://www.dkl.com/dk/pdfs/taxes-
whitepaper.pdf (Mar. 10, 1999) (stating a proposal for an In-
ternet-based system that will not burden the merchant, coin-
packages or tax service providers to determine ju-
risdiction-by-jurisdiction tax rates and bases for
each transaction and to prepare and submit state
and local tax returns."' 0 9 Regardless of the type of
uniformity adopted, or lack of adoption, the tech-
nology is available to ease the collection bur-
den. I 10
Other retailers express concern with the cost of
the technology required to calculate transaction
taxes for all state and local governments. A por-
tion of the costs of technology could be offset as
under current law. Some states currently provide
a discount to retailers to offset the cost of collec-
tion and others are willing to adopt such a sys-
tem. I I In the end, "the problem is one of magni-
tude, and the resolution resides within
technology."' 12
IV. THE LEGISLATURES AND THE
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
A. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
The Advisory Commission on Electronic Com-
merce (the "Commission") was formed as part of
the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998.113 When
the Commission was formed, some business and
anti-tax organizations were concerned that it
promise the buyer's privacy or impose new kinds of taxes.);
e.g., R. Scot Grierson, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxa-
tion: Sales and Use Tax Nexus on the Information Highway, 10
STATE TAX NOTES 589, 597 (1996) ("The technology to track
sales under such a sourcing scheme [using the Universal
Product Code requirement] may already exist. AVP Systems
has already announced development of software capable of
permitting merchants to track sales tax for users of online
services in North America.").
i I I See Schwartz, supra note 74, at A4 (quoting John Trus-
cott of Goy. John Engler's (R-MI) office, "We believe that
there is technology available that would allow very easy tax
collection to be done by the companies and we're willing to
pay them for it.").
112 ESALESTAX.COM, INC., PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS ISSUES OF
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION OF INTERNET TRANSACTIONS FOR
THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1,
available at http://www.ecommercecommission.org/docu-
ment/ALEProposall 117.doc (Nov. 11, 1999).
113 Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. C, Title XI Stat. 2681-719
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. IV 1999)).
The law also established a three-year moratorium on new or
discriminatory taxes. During such time the Commission was
to engage in the "study of Federal, State, and local, and inter-
national taxation and tariff treatment of transactions using
the Internet and Internet access and other comparable intra-
state, interstate or international sales activities." 47 U.S.C.
§ 151 (g) (1).
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would favor the side of the state and local govern-
ments, and expand the authority of the states to
require out-of-state retailers to collect transaction
taxes.1 14 "States and localities believe[d] the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act should be used as a vehi-
cle to put in motion an examination of a simpler,
more uniform, more evenly applied sales tax sys-
tem that will be required in this country in the 21S
Century."'1 15 As a result, Congress imposed the re-
quirement of a two-thirds vote in order to report
recommendations to Congress. 16 Ironically, the
two-thirds vote served to protect the states from
the anti-tax organizations by restricting the ability
of the anti-tax organizations to make biased,
nonmajority supported recommendations to Con-
gress. 1
17
During debate on the Internet Tax Freedom
Act, Senator Wyden made clear that "the bill
would not preempt state and local taxes that are
currently on the books."'118 In his view, the ratio-
nale for the moratorium was to "call a time-out on
114 See Interview with Stan Fendley, U.S. Senate Comm.
on Finance, Minority Tax Counsel (Mar. 22, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Fendley Interview] (on file with author); see also Duncan
Statement, supra note 82, at 51-52 ("Any legislation passed
by the Congress should be prospective only and should not
preempt taxes that are currently imposed by state and local
governments on various aspects of electronic commerce.").
115 Duncan Statement, supra note 82, at 53.
116 The Nat'l Governors' Ass'n supported an expanded
role for the Commission, which included determining how
interstate sales tax collection should apply to all cross-border
sellers, including mail order firms. See Internet Tax and Trade
Issues: Hearing on S. 442 and H. K 4105 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 105th Cong. 77 (1998) (statement of Raymond C.
Scheppach, Nat'l Governors' Ass'n); cf Internet Tax and Trade
Issues: Hearing on S. 442 and H.R 4105 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 105th Cong. 68 (1998) (statement of Mark A. Mi-
cali, Direct Marketing Ass'n) (noting that the Direct Market-
ing Ass'n opposed a broad mandate of formulating a policy
regarding interstate sales tax collection).
117 See Fendley Interview, supra note 114.
118 Angela Drolte, McCain Vows Swift Action on Internet Bill
Despite Opposition From State Authorities, BNA TAX, BUDGET &
ACCOUNTING, June 23, 1997, at G4, G6.
119 Id.
120 Letter from Lawrence H. Summers, Deputy Sec'y,
Dep't of Treasury, to Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, at http://
www.treasury.gov/cc/071598.htm (July 15, 1998).
121 Schwartz, supra note 74, at A4 (quoting Gov. Gil-
more, "I want to decriminalize the American people who are
buying goods and services over the Internet.").
122 See ACEC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 4-6.
The issue areas that received more than two-thirds support
were: 1) digital divide; 2) privacy implications of Internet tax-
ation; and 3) international taxes and tariffs. Issue areas re-
ceiving only majority support were: 1) sales and use taxes; 2)
business activity taxes; 3) Internet access; 4) taxation of tele-
communications services and providers; 5) international
the proliferation of taxes that single out elec-
tronic commerce."' 1 9 The administration viewed
the Commission as an opportunity to "explore the
longer-term tax issues raised by electronic com-
merce, in order to develop a policy framework
that [was] fair to states and localities while al-
lowing the Internet to earn its fair place in the
ever-changing business world.' 120 Nonetheless,
once formed, Governor James S. Gilmore III (R-
VA) became chairman of the Commission and be-
came "[t]he strongest voice against taxing In-
ternet purchases."'121
The Commission's Report to Congress reflected
the contentious nature of the Commission. In-
stead of meeting its purpose, the Commission
failed to gain two-thirds support from its members
for all but three issues-none of which addressed
the transaction tax dilemma.122 Furthermore, the
Commission's recommendations have not re-
ceived the necessary support from Congress 1 23 or
the states. 12 4 The prospects for congressional ac-
taxes and tariffs; and 6) the need for improved knowledge of
international ramifications. Id.
123 See generally Matthew Vadum, Internet Taxation Bill
Stalled in House Subcommittee, THE BOND BUYER, May 18, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 5811925. Vadum reported that:
A House bill that would enshrine into law some of the
recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Elec-
tronic Commerce regarding Internet taxation is going
nowhere for the time being. After yesterday's rancorous
hearing before the House Judiciary Committee's com-
mercial and administrative law subcommittee,
[C]hairman George Gekas, R-Pa., said the bill was 'no-
where near' a markup because both backers and oppo-
nents of the bill need more time to present their views to
his panel.
Id.
124 See generally 2000 Internet Taxes: Hearing on H.t 4267,
HR. 4460, and HR. 4462 Before the House Subcomm. on Com-
mercial and Administrative Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Gary Viken, Sec'y South Dakota
Dep't of Revenue and 1st Vice President, Fed'n of Tax
Adm'rs). Sec'y Viken noted that:
[F]orty-two governors have written to the leadership of
the Congress asking that they reject the Commission re-
port. More than 100 academic economists have also
signed a letter criticizing the report as reflecting inap-
propriate and misguided tax policy . .. The Report of
the Advisory Commission on Electronic Commerce un-
fortunately, in the opinion of most state and local offi-
cials, does not further the goals of sound tax policy and
administration in this area. Instead, it contains recom-
mendations for substantial preemption of state tax au-
thority that are not only detrimental to the fiscal posi-
tion of states and localities, but will likewise cement into
place the unlevel playing field facing fixed-base retailers
and other current taxpayers.
Id.
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tion in the near future on the Commission's rec-
ommendations are dim.1 25 Additionally, prospects
for congressional action on a bill reflecting the
position of the states are dim. 126
1. Confusion to the Masses
The Internet tax moratorium included in the
Internet Tax Freedom Act is not a moratorium on
all taxes. 27 Rather, it is a moratorium on new or
discriminatory taxes. 1 2  Accordingly, those pro-
tecting the states' interests (i.e., to retain or ex-
pand transaction tax collection authority) did not
view the moratorium as discriminatory treatment
advantaging the Internet retailer at the expense
of the brick-and-mortar retailer. 2 9 Conveniently,
however, there is great confusion as to what is and
is not covered under the moratorium.
As previously discussed, the 1996 Act did not
classify the Internet as a telecommunications ser-
vice. Nonetheless, prior to the Internet Tax Free-
dom Act, twelve states and the District of Colum-
bia imposed a similar transaction tax on Internet
access as that imposed for telephone service. 30
As such, the primary target of this moratorium
was a "tax" on Internet access.' 3' There are a vari-
ety of additional assessments-either a fee or a
125 See generally Robert MacMillan, Net Tax Group Bemoans
Sen. Dorgan Bill, NEWSBYrES, June 27, 2000, available at 2000
WL 2117921 (reporting that "[w]hile the House of Repre-
sentatives passed that measure, it has been held up in the
Commerce Committee, with Chairman John McCain, R-Ariz.,
unwilling to hold a vote on the bill because of widespread
opposition to keeping e-commerce outside of any possible lo-
cal taxation").
126 See id.
[S]en. Dorgan's bill, S. 2775, fulfills a long-awaited
promise he and other Senate Commerce Committee
members made to state and local governments to try to
devise a bill that would prevent unfettered Internet taxa-
tion while at the same time calling for those states and
localities to simplify their tax systems to make it possible
to collect some revenues from online transactions.
Id. 'Sen. Dorgan's bill resembles a bill introduced by Sen.
Dale Bumpers in 1994, infra note 175. Supporters of the bill
include the Multi-state Tax Comm'n, the Fed'n of Tax
Adm'rs, the Nat'l Governors Ass'n, the Council of State
Gov'ts, the Council of Chief State School Officers, the Int'l
Council of Shopping Centers, the Int'l Mass Retail Ass'n, the
Nat'l Retail Fed'n, the Real Estate Roundtable and the E-Fair-
ness Coalition (made up of retailers). Robert MacMillan, Net
Tax Group Bemoans Sen. Dorgan Bill, NEWSBYrES, June 27, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 21179216.
127 Seegenerally 47 U.S.C. § 151.
128 See id. at § 151(a) ("No State or political subdivision
thereof shall impose any of the following taxes during the
period beginning on October 1, 1998, and ending 3 years
tax-that appear on the consumer's telephone
bill. Ironically, the access charge' 3 2 imposed on
long-distance carriers is not a tax at all. At the fed-
eral level, there is imposed a 3% excise tax on all
telecommunications services. 133 Most states also
charge an excise tax at this same base. Not to be
confused with a tax, however, is a fee known as
the E-rate.134 The E-rate is imposed on long-dis-
tance carriers to provide schools, libraries and ru-
ral health care centers with telecommunication
services, wiring and computer equipment. Finally,
universal service to all customers regardless of lo-
cation is funded through "access charges" im-
posed on long-distance carriers. 35 These access
charges have received little attention even though
they served as the impetus for the Internet Tax
Freedom Act.
2. Parity for the Internet and the Brick-and-Mortar
Retailer
What does nondiscriminatory mean? In its testi-
mony before Congress, the administration made
clear that it did "not want duplicative, discrimina-
tory or inappropriate taxation by thousands of dif-
ferent state and local tax jurisdictions to stunt the
development of what President Clinton ... called
after the date of the enactment of this Act-(1) taxes on In-
ternet access... (2) multiple or discriminatory taxes on elec-
tronic commerce.").
129 See Duncan Statement, supra note 82, at 52.
130 See ACEC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 23.
31 See Duncan Statement, supra note 82, at 52 (noting
that "[t] he primary current tax at issue in this legislation is
the imposition of state and local sales and use taxes on
charges for Internet access and online services."); see also 47
U.S.C. § 151 (e) (3) (D). Section 151(e) (3) (D) states:
The term 'Internet access' means a service that enables
users to access content, information, electronic mail, or
other services offered over the Internet, and may also
include access to proprietary content, information, and
other services as part of a package of services offered to
consumers. Such term does not include telecommunica-
tions services.
Id.
132 See generally HENK BRANDS & EVAN LEO, THE LAw AND
REGULATION OF TELECOMMUNIcATIONS CARRIERS 693 (1999).
Access charges are defined as "[c]harges that long-distance
carriers must pay for their use of the local-exchange network
in connection with long-distance service. Interstate access
charges are regulated by the FCC;. intrastate access charges
are regulated by the states." Id.
133 I.R.C. § 4251 (Supp. IV 1999).
134 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (6) (Supp. IV 1999).
'35 See Jeffrey A. Eisenach, The High Cost of Taxing
Telecom, 2, at http://ecommercecommission.org (last visited
Sept. 24, 2000).
[Vol. 9
Internet Transaction Taxes
'the most promising new economic opportunity
in decades.' "136 "The Administration's key objec-
tives [we]re no new Internet taxes and neutrality
in taxing electronic commerce. '" 137
Regarding taxation of the Internet, the Trea-
sury Department promoted the tax policy princi-
ples used in other areas. Specifically, Internet tax
policy based on neutrality, fairness and simplic-
ity138 serves to encourage economic activity.139
For purposes of the Internet, the primary princi-
ple, however, should be neutrality.1 40 Economi-
cally similar income should be treated equally
under the tax system.14 1
Ideally, tax rules would not affect economic
choices about the structure of markets and com-
mercial activities. This will ensure that market
forces alone determine the success or failure of
new commercial methods. The best means by
which neutrality can be achieved is through an ap-
proach that adopts and adapts existing principles
in lieu of imposing new or additional taxes. 142
Neutrality is not only the resounding theme of
the administration, but it is also the approach of
many states and other countries. Governor
Michael Leavitt (R-Utah) stated it simply: "Do we
create a permanent special privilege for a group
of shoppers who will not be required to support
our schools, our roads and law enforcement? Or
do we have a level playing field where everyone is
treated the same?" 143 The international commu-
nity, through the European Union and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment ("OECD"), also views a fair, nondis-
criminatory and predictable tax system as a prior-
ity for transaction taxes. 1 44 Further, certain
businesses recognize that it is not rational eco-
nomic or tax policy to provide special treatment
to one group of retailers to the detriment of
136 Internet Tax and Trade Issues: Hearing on S. 442 and
H.R 4105 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 105th Cong. 59
(1998) (statement ofJoseph H. Guttentag, Dep't of Treasury
Deputy Assistant Sec'y (Int'l Tax Affairs)).
137 Id. at 60.
138 However, these are at times competing goals-espe-
cially simplicity coupled with neutrality or fairness.
139 See generally TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 3 n.1.
The Treasury Report was "limited to federal income taxation
issues. These technological developments also raise other is-
sues, such as the effect on subfederal taxation, which are
outside the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, Treasury be-
lieves that these new technologies should not be used to jus-
tify new taxes." Id.
140 See id. at 19.
141 See id.
others.1 45 In fact, it is not difficult to imagine the
complexity of a tax system that treats one group of
retailers differently-thus forcing consumers to
know and understand the differences, and tax ad-
ministrators to administer and enforce the law dif-
ferently. The reliability of such a system as a reve-
nue source is jeopardized 146 because businesses
will migrate to a less burdened medium. Cur-
renly, the Internet serves as a less burdened me-
dium for that retailer not having a taxable nexus
in most states. Transactions purchased through
the Internet medium are, however, still subject to
a transaction tax. Parity for the Internet and the
brick-and-mortar retailer is the only equitable ap-
proach for sound tax and economic policy. 147
B. Congress and the States: Is there a Will for
a Way?
1. Political Process Does Not Support Uniformity
Because current law treats all transactions, re-
gardless of the medium, the same for purposes of
the transaction tax, the difficult resolution to the
Internet transaction tax debate is the need for
uniformity in collection. Mancur Olson used eco-
nomic analysis to prove that opposing forces are
not strong enough to counter individual interests
in all aspects of life-not the least of which is
politics.' 48 As such, when faced with legislative
changes, the special interest groups will prevail,
absent special arrangements. 4 9 Machiavelli ex-
plained the difficulty of change by the human na-
ture to distrust new things. 150 Olson, however,
adopts a less sinister and more rational explana-
tion for why change occurs or, more likely, why
change does not occur. When change does occur,
however, it is typically a change that is inefficient
142 See id.
143 Schwartz, supra note 74, at A4.
144 See SIMPLIFICATION, supra note 75, at 2 (citing Outline
of Intervention by Stephen Bill to the OECD Forum on Electronic
Commerce in Paris (Oct. 12-13, 1999)).
145 See id. at 5.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See generally OtsoN, supra note 36.
'49 See id. at 18.
150 See id. at 38 (quoting NIccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE
PRINCE 51 (1961) ("There is nothing more difficult to ar-
range, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to
carry through, than to initiate a new order of things ... Men
are generally incredulous, never really trusting new things
unless they have tested them by experience.")).
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for society as a whole and benefits only a few be-
cause of the special interest groups' dominance in
the process.
Rational individuals will often act in their own
interest before that of a group interest because
any gain from an individual's sacrifice for the
"common" purpose is shared with everyone in the
group. 5 1 This analysis leads to the conclusion
that if greater numbers of individuals benefit
from a public (common) good, "in the absence of
selective incentives, the incentive for group action
diminishes as group size increases, so that large
groups are less able to act in their common inter-
est than small ones."'152
[Consequently,] a society that would achieve either effi-
ciency or equity through comprehensive bargaining is
out of the question. Some groups such as consumers,
taxpayers, the unemployed, and the poor do not have
either the selective incentives or the small numbers
needed to organize, so they would be left out of the
bargaining. It would be in the interest of those groups
that are organized to increase their own gains by
whatever means possible. This would include choosing
policies that, though inefficient for the society as a
whole, were advantageous for the organized groups be-
cause the costs of the policies fell disproportionately on
the unorganized . . . There will be no countries that
attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a
common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes
through comprehensive bargaining.' 5 3
Olson further explains that:
[Tihe typical organization for collective action within a
society will, at least if it represents only a narrow seg-
ment of the society, have little or no incentive to make
any significant sacrifices in the interest of the society; it
can best serve its members' interests by striving to seize
a larger share of a society's production for them ...
[T] here is ... no constraint on the social cost such an
organization will find it expedient to impose on the so-
ciety in the course of obtaining a larger share of the
social output for itself.' 54
Compulsory taxation, through which govern-
ments redistribute wealth for the benefit of every-
one in society, is a "special arrangement" to pro-
tect the funding of common goods from the
special interests. 55 Other groups may be fortu-
nate enough to have "incentives . . . that appl[y]
selectively to the individuals depending on
whether they do or do not contribute to the provi-
151 See OLSON, supra note 36, at 18.
152 Id. at 31.
153 Id. at 37.
154 Id. at 44.
'55 See id. at 20.
156 Id. at 21.
157 See id. at 47.
158 McLure, supra note 69, at 7.
sion of the collective good."' 56 The confusion sur-
rounding the Internet transaction tax debate pro-
duces the former large groups of rational
individuals to mistakenly believe that there is no
transaction tax on Internet purchases. These indi-
viduals do not intend to "sacrifice" for the com-
mon good by supporting a transaction tax on In-
ternet purchases. Conversely, current law
supports the latter. Transactions on the Internet
are subject to transaction taxes. Given such a "spe-
cial arrangement," legislators should support uni-
formity for collection. In the end, the result is re-
duced efficiency, wealth aggregated in a few and
increased political divisiveness. 157 The Internet
transaction tax debate provides a quintessential
example of all of these negative outcomes.
2. Can Voluntary Cooperation Achieve Complete
State Uniformity?
A cooperative effort without a federal mandate
to develop and implement a uniform system of as-
sessing and collecting transaction taxes by all
states and localities does not sound like an unrea-
sonable or virtually impossible task-but it is. "In
fact, history does not inspire confidence that the
state[s] would act in this way."' 158
The states provide examples of cooperative ef-
forts aimed at uniformity that have not necessarily
achieved adoption or uniformity. 159 With the rise
in Internet transactions, the states have again at-
tempted to reach uniformity. The National Tax
Association Communications and Electronic
Commerce Tax Project ("NTA") was formed "to
develop a broadly available public report that
identifies and explores the issues involved in ap-
plying state and local taxes and fees to electronic
commerce and that makes recommendations to
state and local officials regarding the application
of such taxes."'160 NTA membership offered bal-
ance to the views of the interested parties by
bringing "together the business community, state
and local governments, professional organiza-
159 Walter Hellerstein, Taxing Electronic Commerce: Prelimi-
nary Thoughts on Model Uniform Legislation, 75 TAx NOTES 819,
820, 822 n.35, 826 (May 12, 1997). The Uniform Commercial
Code has been adopted by all 50 states. However, the Uni-
form Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA")
has only been adopted in 23 of the 46 states imposing a cor-
porate income tax. Id.
160 NTA, supra note 70, at i.
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tions, and academia who share an interest in iden-
tifying possible solutions to the state and local tax
issues raised by electronic commerce."'161 NTA
made broad recommendations but could not
agree on more specific recommendations. Nor
could the Commission reach agreement. 162
Nonetheless, the administration called for
states and localities to develop a simplified trans-
action tax system "within two years."'163 Recently,
35 state officials met to study simplification and
develop model legislation for uniformity by Janu-
ary 2001.164 Such a group, composed of only state
officials, applying Olson's economic analysis,
holds more promise for recommendations bene-
fiting all of society. However, by not including the
other interested parties-such as Internet provid-
ers, Internet retailers and brick-and-mortar retail-
ers-the recommendations, once made, face a
difficult time in the legislature where those ex-
cluded special interest groups make financial con-
tributions to influence policy-makers. Olson's pro-
position explains the inability of all these groups
and any future groups to reach agreement and
thus make recommendations on the details of a
uniform system.' 65
161 Id.
162 See ACEC REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 19.
The Commission was unable to even reach the two-thirds
necessary to recommend to "[e] ncourage state and local gov-
ernments to work with and through NCCUSL [National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws] in draft-
ing a uniform sales and use tax act within three years after
the expiration of the current Internet Tax Freedom Act mor-
atorium (i.e., by [Oct.] 21, 2004) that would simplify state
and local sales and use taxation." Id.
163 Alison Bennett, Administration Urges States, Localities to
Simplify Tax System in Two Years, BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXEC-
UTIVES, Mar. 21, 2000, at GG2-3.
164 See Schwartz, supra note 74, at A4 ("Once we get it
with 10 or 12 states, we think the other states will get on
pretty quickly." (statement of Ray Scheppach, Executive Dir.
of the Nat'l Governors' Ass'n)).
165 See NTA, supra note 70, at 18 ("Because of the inabil-
ity of the participants to agree on ... simplification and 'spil-
lover' [i.e., that any decision impacts treatment of other
taxes], however, the Project's participants could not agree on
a new standard.").
166 See U.S. CONST. art I, amend. X ("The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
167 See generally Tracey A. Kaye, Show Me the Money: Con-
gressional Limitations on State Tax Sovereignty, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 149, 149-50 (1998) (citing PAULJ. HARTMAN, FEDERAL
LIMTATIONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION 4 (1981))
[hereinafter Kaye].
3. Congressional Mandates Requiring State Action
or Inaction
Under the Constitution, states and the federal
government enjoy dual sovereignty.' 66 The power
of a state to impose and collect taxes is at the
heart of state sovereignty and must not be unduly
curtailed. 167 As such, Congress has at times lim-
ited the states' powers of taxation. 6 In 1998,
Congress again preempted state sovereignty with
the Internet Tax Freedom Act.169
Congressional limitations on state sovereignty
and ability to raise revenue come at a time when
Congress is mandating greater responsibilities on
the states. 17o Congress has the authority, however,
not only to limit state taxation under the negative
commerce clause, but also to "proscribe state laws
on its own views of policy, based on its own con-
sideredjudgment of fairness and equity.' 17 1
4. The Bumpers' Bill
Under Quill, "Congress is now free to decide
whether, when, and to what extent the States
may" require out-of-state retailers to collect trans-
168 See generally NTA, supra note 70, at 50-51. In ISTEA,
Congress mandated participation by the states in a system
that started as a voluntary agreement by the states known as
the Int'l Fuel Tax Agreement ("IFTA"). The mandate pro-
vided a five-year phase-in period until Sept. 30, 1996. At
which time, the states were prohibited from imposing a fuel
use tax if the state was not participating in a base state agree-
ment, which required single filing of return information and
revenue apportionment. The results speak for themselves.
Ten states were part of the 1991 voluntary agreement. By
1996, however, all states except Hawaii and Alaska were part
of the mandated voluntary agreement. Id.
169 See Kaye, supra note 167, at 179-81.
170 See id. at 151 (noting that the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act required the states to make handicap accessible side-
walks without funding this mandate).
'71 Id. at 174 (quoting Congressional Power to Proscribe Cer-
tain State Taxes, State Taxation of Nonresidents' Pension Income:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 99, 100, 102
(1993) (legal memorandum by Johnny Killian, Senior Spe-
cialist, American Constitutional Law, Cong. Res. Serv., Lib. of
Cong.) (citing Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)); see
also Pub. L. No. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (codified as amended
at 23 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). Just as Congress realized such
fairness and equity in the Inter-modal Surface Transporta-
tion and Efficiency Act of 1991 ("ISTEA"), Congress could
apply such principles of fairness and equity to require uni-
formity for transaction taxes balanced with expanded author-
ity to require retailers, regardless of taxable nexus, to collect
transaction taxes.
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action taxes. 1 72 In 1994, Senator Dale Bumpers
(D-AR) accepted the Supreme Court's invitation
to update the Commerce Clause with the intro-
duction of The Tax Fairness for Main Street Busi-
ness Act of 1994. 173 The Bumpers' bill authorized
the states to require interstate use tax collection,
protected affected companies against unreasona-
ble compliance burdens and insured that state
governments distributed the appropriate amount
of resulting revenues to their local jurisdic-
tions. 174
Essentially, Senator Bumpers recognized the in-
equity that Quill caused in the marketplace. 175
Companies such as Quill refuse to collect, compa-
nies such as QVC and the Home Shopping Net-
work voluntarily collect,176 and brick-and-mortar
retailers have to collect transaction taxes. Under
the Bumpers' bill, the collection would be
mandatory, 177 and the playi'ng field leveled. 1 78
But, falling to the pressures analyzed by Olson,
Congress failed to pass the legislation. 179 Al-
though the bill enjoyed the support of the states
and localities,""' it "came under heavy opposition
from the direct marketers [and] was character-
ized as a 'new tax,' . . . [that would] hurt the econ-
omy [and] complicate mail-order forms."'' If op-
posing forces were strong enough to prevent
passage of the Bumpers' legislation, the incredi-
172 Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.
173 S. 1825, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (including Sec-
tion 9 of the Tax Fairness for Main Street Business Act, defin-
ing "sales tax" to include use taxes).
174 See Stan Fendley, Dancing with the Commerce Clause: The
Impending Battle Over Interstate Use Tax Collection, 26 ARK. Bus.
& ECON. REv. 1, 5 (1993) [hereinafter Fendley]. The author
was Sen. Bumpers' Tax Counsel on the U.S. Senate Comm.
on Small Business.
175 See S. 1825, 103 Cong., 2d Sess. The Act's language
provides that: 1) a destination tax whereby an out-of-state
company was required to collect transaction taxes if it solicits
business in the taxing state and ships tangible personal prop-
erty into the taxing state; 2) an exemption for a company if
its interstate revenue is less than $3 million; 3) the ability to
use a standard local tax rate in lien of multiple rates; 4) for
states to collect and distribute for local jurisdictions prior to
receiving expanded collection duty requirements; 5) limita-
tions on tax return filing to no more than once per quarter;
6) for maintenance of toll-free state telephone service; and
7) a distribution formula whereby states must remit local
taxes collected from out-of-state companies in the proportion
to the local taxes collected from in-state companies. Id.
176 See id. at § 2(5).
177 See id.
178 See Schwartz, supra note 74, at A4. The author ex-
plained that Gov. Michael Leavitt (R-UT):
[N]ot only doubts that the Gilmore commission will take
a strong stand, he predicts that Congress will not take up
ble rise in the use of the Internet offers dim pros-
pects for a different outcome today.
5. Jurisdictional Integration
Olson argues that with 'jurisdictional integra-
tion" societies expand free trade 1 2 between the
smaller parts of the larger "community," expand
the free movement of production components
and shift the location of power to make some eco-
nomic policy decisions. '83 Following jurisdictional
integration, Olson notes that there is fairly rapid
economic progress.18 4 Jurisdictional integration,
therefore, (e.g., the Bumpers' legislation) fosters
the very things (e.g., economic growth) that the
opposing forces argue it would hurt.
An example of jurisdictional integration is the
Common Market, 8 5 which provides relatively free
trade and movement of production components
as well as a shift of authority for tariffs from the
separate six nations' capitals to the European Eco-
nomic Community.8 6 The formation of the
United States from the thirteen colonies also was
the result of jurisdictional integration, creating
"an area of free trade and factor mobility, as well
as a shift in the institutions that made some of the
governmental decisions."'18 7
The free flow of commerce across the states ef-
such a thorny issue in an election year. That means the
issue will continue to percolate without resolution
through the next election. But it will surely return with
the Christmas shopping season, which promises to
pump billions of dollars more into Internet commerce.
When that happens, traditional retailers will turn to
Washington, Leavitt predicted: 'They're going to storm
Capitol Hill with one phrase on their lips: 'level playing
field.'
Id.
179 141 CONG. REc. S1157-58 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1995)
(noting that the Senate voted 73 to 25 to table the Bumpers'
bill when it was offered as an amendment to the Unfunded
Mandates Act of 1995).
180 Support came from the Nat'l Governors' Ass'n, Nat'l
Conference of State Legislatures, The U.S. Conference of
Mayors, The Nat'l Ass'n of Counties, Nat'l League of Cities,
Nat'l Educ. Ass'n and the Nat'l School Boards Ass'n.
181 Fendley, supra note 174, at 5-6.
182 The term "free trade" should not be confused with
"no-tax." Free trade, instead, refers to ensuring that a tariff
placed on one competitor is also placed on another (or not
placed on either) regardless of the location of the sale and
the destination of the good.
183 See OLSON, supra note 36, at 121.
184 See id.
185 See id. at 119.
186 See id.
187 Id. at 120 ("The adoption of the Constitution did, in
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fectively results in a seamless nation for purposes
of commerce. Ironically, the United States is
again at a point in its history for which the individ-
ual policy-makers must recognize the need for an-
other iteration of jurisdictional integration to en-
sure that the nation continues its economic
growth without sacrificing its public goods. None-
theless, given the perhaps insurmountable
problems with legislative change for the common
good, can Congress or the state legislatures reach
the necessary conclusions? If not, is there an op-
portunity for the Supreme Court-a small, organ-
ized group-to resolve the issue for the benefit of
the larger populace?
V. THE AFTERMATH OF-AND A POSSIBLE
RESOLUTION OF-THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN QUILL
A. Evolution of the Retailer
Retail business evolution has experienced at
least four phases: from the local retailer selling
primarily tangible personal goods to local con-
sumers (e.g., traditional brick-and mortar-retailers
such as Wal-Mart); to mail-order catalog retailers
(e.g., Quill); to the click-and-mortar retailer (e.g.,
fact, remove tariffs that New York had established against cer-
tain imports from Connecticut and New Jersey.").
188 See generally Steve Harmon, Much Ado About Books:
barnesandnoble.com's IPO vs. Amazon.Com, Internet Stock Report
Mecklermedia's Internet.com, at http://www.lnternetstockre-
port.com/column/article/Q,1661_S8191,00.html (Sept. 29,
1998). Harmon discusses Barnes & Noble's launch in March
1999 of barnesandnoble.com: "Already in the works by
barnesandnoble.com are downloadable books. When that
happens in a friendly, portable, clear, easy user format, then
barnesandnoble.com may leave Barnes & Noble far behind.
As the story goes perhaps it's not barnesandnoble.com vs.
Amazon but barnesandnoble 'dot.com' vs. Barnes & Noble,
the 'undot.com,' two sides of a well-established company
that's undergoing a revolutionary shift from land to Web." Id.
189 See Simons, supra note 73 ("Amazon competitor Bor-
ders Group, Inc., of Ann Arbor, Mich., set up Borders On-
line, Inc. as a separate operation to handle Internet sales. As
a result, although Borders Group operates bookstores in all
but 10 states, Borders Online charges tax in only two: Ten-
nessee, where it has a warehouse, and Michigan where it
shares a corporate base with Borders Group.").
190 386 U.S. at 758.
191 Quill, 504 U.S. at 316.
192 See ISA WHITE PAPER, supra note 6, at 217-18.
In SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666,
668-71 (Conn. 1991), Connecticut's revenue depart-
ment claimed that, primarily because Saks Fifth Avenue
Stamford, Inc. ("Saks-Stamford") had nexus in the state
in the form of the stores that it operated there, its mail-
order affiliate, SFA Folio Collections, Inc. ("Folio"), was
Barnes & Noble with brick-and-mortar stores na-
tionwide and barnesandnoble.com); to the click-
and-one-brick retailer (e.g., Amazon.com, with a
building in only one state but no physical store
presence). The growth in Internet retail opportu-
nities challenges the traditional brick-and-mortar
retailers' ability to reach the ever-expanding cli-
ent base now available.' 8 The holding in Quill en-
courages brick retailers to enter the "click" mar-
ket with the same advantages (i.e., no
requirement to collect transaction taxes) as the
retailers in QuilL189
B. Internet Transaction Tax Cases
Contrary to the Court's expectation in Quill
that adhering to the bright-line contemplated in
National Bellas Hess'90 would encourage "settled
expectations,"' 91 the states have been applying al-
ternative nexus theories and are expected to con-
tinue these challenges. 192 These challenges have
included the technology advances of the Internet.
The Internet, which has advanced computer tech-
nology far beyond what was imaginable in 1992, is
quickly becoming as prevalent as the telephone
and the television. "It's becoming our new town
required to collect use tax on its taxable sales into the
state. The state relied solely on the relationship rather
than on any proof that Saks-Stamford was performing
any in-state activities on behalf of Folio. The state's Su-
preme Court struck the effort down. In Current, Inc. v.
California State Board of Equalization, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d
407, 408-12 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1994), the board
claimed that, because Deluxe Checkprinters, Inc. had a
nexus in the state and because its wholly owned mail-
order subsidiary, Current, Inc., sold many of the same
items as its parent, the subsidiary was required to collect
use tax on taxable sales into the state. The California
Court of Appeal ruled against the board. Here the state
relied solely on the relationship rather than on any
proof that the parent was performing any in-state activi-
ties on behalf of the subsidiary. In SFA Folio Collections,
Inc. v. Tracy, 652 N.E.2d 693, 695-98 (Ohio 1995), the*
Ohio Department of Revenue similarly claimed that the
out-of-state mail-order seller, Folio, must collect use tax
on its taxable sales into the state solely by virtue of its
relationship to an affiliate, Saks Fifth Avenue of Ohio,
Inc. (Saks-Ohio) that operated stores in the state. In this
case, the department relied on a statute specifying that a
seller had taxable nexus if it 'Maintains a place of busi-
ness within this state... operated by... a member of an
affiliated group ... of which the seller is a member... '
The state's Supreme Court ruled that the department's
interpretation of the statute was erroneous and that Fo-
lio did not have taxable nexus in the state.
Id.
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square, changing the way we relate to one an-
other, the way we send mail, the way we hear
news, the way we play."' 9
C. Amazon.com Is the Transaction Tax Case to
Overturn Quill
The purposeful locating of a retailer's physical
facility evidences the depths of behavior en-
couraged by the inconsistent and unfair applica-
tion of the Commerce Clause under Quill. Six
years ago, Jeff Bezos founded Amazon.com.
Within the first three years of operations, Bezos
was worth over $2 billion194 and Amazon.com was
the third-largest book retailer in the country. 195
The advances in modern technology that caught
Bezos' attention included the 2,300%-a-year
growth in the Internet. 96 Methodically he
planned what to sell, where to locate and how to
distribute.
He chose books because of the variety of product
(more than a million titles in print), because no one
merchandiser dominated the market (Barnes & Noble,
the largest, had only about a 12[%] share) and because
computers could be very useful in helping customers in
ill-defined searches for hazily remembered volumes. 197
It was the Supreme Court's holding in Quill,
however, that determined the location-or lack
thereof-of Amazon.com's one place of physical
presence (i.e., taxable nexus). "California was out
because it had too many people-all of whom
would have to pay sales tax if they bought any
books from an in-state company."'198 Ultimately,
Bezos chose Seattle, Washington. Although Wash-
ington has a transaction tax, there are not as
many people that would have to pay such tax, and
Washington is technology friendly. 99
While it is predicted that Amazon.com is the In-
ternet's version of Wal-Mart, 200 there are signifi-
cant differences to consider. Unlike traditional
193 TREASURY PAPER, supra note 6, at 3.
194 See Technologys 100 Wealthiest, FORBES ASAP, Oct. 5,
1998, at 51 (reporting that "Jeff Bezos (34) - Holdings 19.8
million shares / $2.14 billion").
195 See David Streitfeld, Booking the Future: Does Ama-
zon.com Show That Publishing Clicks on the Internet?, THE WASH-
INGTON POST, July 10, 1998, at Al.
196 See id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 See id.
200 See George Anders, Cybersqueeze, Comparison Shopping
Is the Web's Virtue-Unless You're a Seller: Amazon. cor, Others Face
Weak Pricing and Losses Even as Their Stocks Soar, Can a Fifth
Avenue Develop?, THE WALL ST. J., July 23, 1998, at A25 (quot-
brick-and-mortar retailers and even mail-order
catalog retailers, Amazon.com as a natural result
of its Internet existence, has lower costs (i.e., real
estate is minimal compared to its reach to con-
sumers, employees are fewer per consumer and
inventory is unnecessary because ofjust-in-time in-
ventory methods). "As a company, Amazon owns
almost nothing-no buildings, no factories, noth-
ing that qualifies as equity in the traditional
sense." 20 1 Yet Amazon.com is as branded in our
minds as Xerox or Kleenex. 202
Ironically, for this business, which uses the most
sophisticated technology, its "whole purpose is to
retrieve something that thrived in the past."203 Ac-
cording to Bezos, "I want to transport online
bookselling back to the days of the small book-
seller, who got to know you very well." 20 4 This "re-
trieval" should include collection of transaction
taxes, and "getting to know" the consumer should
include asking for a billing address or a shipping
address. Amazon.com embodies the incredible
advances in computer technology and the ease of
interstate commerce through the Internet. Its na-
tional presence is comparable to companies that
voluntarily collect transaction taxes on all
purchases based on the destination address. 20 5
One or more of the states or localities, other
than Washington, currently imposing a transac-
tion tax could challenge Amazon.com's failure to
collect transaction taxes, making a compelling
case that the incredible advances in computer
technology, which Amazon.com uses to make
book browsing so easy, also makes it easy for Ama-
zon.com to collect transaction taxes. First, Ama-
zon.com knows-or can know quite easily-the
consumer's address. Second, because Ama-
zon.com's product lines are limited-books, mu-
sic, videos, tools, electronics and software-the
complications associated with variations in the tax
ing Bryan Grace, an analyst at Vaughan, Nelson, Scarbor-
ough & McCullough).
201 David Streitfeld, Booking the Future: Does Amazon.com
Show That Publishing Clicks on the Internet?, THE WASHINGTON
POST, July 10, 1998, at Al.
202 See id. (quoting book publisher Peter Osnos).
203 Id.
204 [d.
205 On Mar. 31, 2000, the author purchased computer
hardware from Dell Computers. Dell calculated the sales tax
for the destination address, even though Dell has no physical
presence in the state. According to the sales representative,
the computer calculates the tax automatically based on the
destination zip code.
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base are diminished significantly. As such, Ama-
zon.com's products will generally be considered
the same for purposes of transaction tax imposi-
tion (i.e., either a state taxes or does not tax the
sale of a book). Amazon.com would have little dif-
ficulty tracking which states impose such taxes.
Similarly, Amazon.com's technological prowess
removes any difficulty in tracking the tax rates im-
posed by the states.
Confronted with a case involving such an appar-
ent lack of burden, the Supreme Court might find
that the Commerce Clause is no longer an imped-
iment to interstate transaction tax collection. In-
deed, it is not difficult to imagine the Court devel-
oping a test to determine a retailer's transaction
tax collection requirements. Such a test might
consider the size, product line(s) and technologi-
cal capabilities of the retailer for the lower courts
to use in determining when such collection re-
quirements do unduly burden interstate com-
merce.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Internet provides the "advances in com-
puter technology"20 6 that were missing from the
facts in Quill. The world of the Internet takes the
words of Justice White, in his Quill dissent, to a
new level:
[I]n today's economy, physical presence frequently has
very little to do with a transaction a State might seek to
tax. Wire transfers of money involving billions of dollars
occur every day; purchasers place orders with sellers by
fax, phone, and computer linkup; sellers ship goods by
air, road, and sea through sundry delivery services with-
out leaving their place of business. It is certainly true
that the days of the door-to-door salesperson are not
206 Quill, 504 U.S. at 303.
207 Id. at 328-29.
208 See id at 329 ("Also very questionable is the rationality
of perpetuating a rule that creates an interstate tax shelter
for one form of business-mail-order sellers-but no coun-
tervailing advantage for its competitors. If the Commerce
Clause was intended to put businesses on an even playing
gone. Nevertheless, an out-of-state direct marketer de-
rives numerous commercial benefits from the State in
which it does business ... [and] creat[es] the greatest
infrastructure burdens and undercut[s] the State's
home companies by its comparative price advantage in
selling products free of use taxes, and yet not have to
collect such taxes if it lacks a physical presence in the
taxing State.
2 0
7
Justice White's concern with the economic un-
fairness between in-state and out-of-state retailers
created by the majority's holding 20 8 contradicts
the Court's reasoning in Complete Auto "that ad-
ministrative convenience . . . is insufficient justifi-
cation for abandoning the principle that 'inter-
state commerce may be made to pay its way.' "209
Today, Amazon.com and other Internet retailers
reach the consumer with far greater ease across
interstate boundaries than at any time in the past.
Technology also eliminates the burden of transac-
tion tax collection. Ironically, it is the Supreme
Court's adherence to Quill that results in greater
burden on interstate commerce than jurisdic-
tional integration of the transaction tax system.
"Although Congress can and should address it-
self to this area of law, [the Supreme Court]
should not adhere to a decision, however right it
was at the time, that by reason of later cases and
economic reality can no longer be rationally justi-
fied."210 A Supreme Court holding overturning
Quill's Commerce Clause limitation and requiring
jurisdictional integration, through uniformity and
collection requirements imposed on all retailers,
is the only way to provide a fair, neutral and sim-
ple transaction tax system. A federal mandate of
jurisdictional integration will eliminate interstate
burdens and foster economic growth for the
greater community.
field, the majority's rule is hardly a way to achieve that goal.
Indeed, arguably even under the majority's explanation for
its 'Commerce Clause nexus' requirement, the unfairness of
its rule on retailers other than direct marketers should be
taken into account.").
209 Id. at 329 (citing Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 289 n.15).
210 Id. at 333 (White, J., dissenting).
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